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A recent study of death penalty cases has revealed that judges, who
are ordinarily thought of as the guardians of criminal defendants'
constitutional rights, often impose harsher punishments than jurors. This
may be unsettling in its own right, but it is especially concerning when
one considers that judges are the individuals charged with determining
whether punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment and that these determinations are supposed to be
based on society's evolving standards of decency. The study suggests
that judges are out of step with society's moral norms, raising the
question of why our justice system entrusts judges, rather than juries,
with resolving questions of whether punishments are unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual. This Article argues that juries are better equipped to
make these determinations and that charging juries to employ their own
moral values to decide these matters is more consistent with the
underlying purpose and history of the ratification of the Eighth
Amendment. This shift in power would also be in line with the Supreme
Court's recent elevation of the jury in criminal cases such as Apprendi
v. New Jersey and United States v. Booker.
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INTRODUCTION
Judges are ordinarily thought of as safeguarding the constitutional
rights of social and political minorities. But research has demonstrated
that, at least in the criminal context, judges can become conditioned to
defendants' suffering' and actually come down harder on criminal
defendants than do juries.2 This result is exacerbated in jurisdictions in
which judges are elected and thus often campaign on the ground that
they are tough on crime.3 A recent and much-publicized example of
judges' predispositions against criminal defendants in this context is
Alabama judges' use of the state's jury-override system in capital
sentencing. 4 Under Alabama law, a jury determines whether a defendant
convicted of a capital offense deserves the death penalty.5 The presiding
judge, however, has the power to overrule the jury's conclusion and
either impose the death penalty on the offender or demonstrate mercy
6
and sentence the offender to life imprisonment instead. A recent study
has revealed that, in 92% of cases in which Alabama judges overrode
the jury's determination of whether capital punishment was justified,
the judges used that power to impose capital Punishment rather than a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. These judges, then, are
1. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311,353
(2003).
2. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE
14-16 (2011), available at http://eji.org/eji/files/OverrideReport.pdf.
3. See id.
4. See Adam Liptak, Overriding the Jury in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2011, at
A13.
5. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1975).
6. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1975) ("While the jury's recommendation concerning
sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court.").
7. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE, supra note 2, at 14. This
study examined the 107 cases of judicial override in Alabama between 1976 and 2011. See id.
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not functioning to protect criminal defendants from overzealous,
revenge-hungry jurors as ordinarily thought. And Justice John Paul
Stevens has stated that Alabama judges are not alone in imposing
harsher punishments than juries; 8 the effect is pervasive. 9
Judges' tendencies to impose harsher punishments than jurors are
concerning because judges are the individuals entrusted to protect
criminal offenders from the cruel and unusual punishments proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment. In making these determinations, judges
often act as independent decisionmakers not beholden to the
communities whose values the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause
is designed to reflect. Judges resolving issues of cruelty and unusualness
purport to rely on punishment trends among the states, but judges have
been accused of manipulating this data and instead imposing their own
moral views on the rest of society by deciding which punishments are
too cruel to be imposed on criminal offenders. Indeed, this lack of
foundation for judges' Punishments Clause determinations is one of the
central criticisms of this constitutional doctrine.
This Article examines the purpose and history of the Eighth
Amendment Punishments Clause and asserts that juries, rather than
judges, should determine whether punishments are unconstitutionally
cruel. 10 Part I provides a brief overview of current Punishments Clause
jurisprudence in this country. Part II identifies unconstitutional cruelty
as a deeply moral question and explains that Punishments Clause
determinations are not the only constitutional moral questions in our
justice system that must be resolved. Questions of First Amendment
obscenity, for example, are similarly rooted in society's mores. Part III
explains that not only are Punishments Clause and obscenity questions
8. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Jiudges
are far more likely than juries to impose the death penalty. This has long been the case, and the
recent experience of judicial overrides confirms it."). Justice Stevens was appointed to the
Supreme Court by President Ford in 1975 and retired in June of 2010.
9. See id. at 521 & n.8; see also CENTER FOR STUDIES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
41-46 (stating that juries are more lenient in several types of capital cases, such as when the
defendant exhibits "a measure of mental and emotional instability," but also suggesting that
judges are more lenient than juries in some capital cases); Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello,
Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 195, 196, 213 (1992) (stating that, during the period from 1972 to 1992, Florida judges
overrode jury determinations of life imprisonment to impose death sentences in 134 cases---"3.6
times" as often as they overrode death sentences to impose sentences of life imprisonment).
10. Although the Eighth Amendment proscribes "cruel and unusual punishments," I have
argued elsewhere that the cruelty and unusualness components must be independently assessed
and that the cruelty inquiry is akin to the Court's turn to its independent judgment. See Meghan
J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are
Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 615-18 (2010); see also infra text
accompanying notes 62-66.
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similar in that they are based on moral values, but also the U.S.
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in each of these areas is similar in that
the Court directly invokes the evolving nature of law in making both of
these constitutional judgments. This Part points out, however, that
Punishments Clause and obscenity determinations differ in that judges
decide Punishments Clause questions as questions of law whereas juries
decide obscenity questions as mixed questions of law and fact. Part III
then proceeds to describe the advantage of individualization that jury
determinations offer and also addresses some of the concerns that critics
ordinarily have about jury decisionmaking, such as legal nonuniformity
and the majoritarian difficulty." Some nonuniformity may be healthy in
our constitutional system, though, so that distinct communities have the
ability to govern themselves. Moreover, such local sovereignty was
central to the impetus behind the drafting and ratification of the Bill of
Rights, which embodied concerns about states safeguarding their
citizens' rights rather than federally protecting the rights of individuals.
These ideals are consistent with the prominent role of the jury-the
ultimate body of local self-government with the ability to check the
power of the sovereign-in the Bill of Rights. Considering the
advantages that juries have to offer and the central role of juries in our
constitutional framework, Part IV explores the history of the jury in the
United States in an attempt to uncover why First Amendment obscenity
issues are considered mixed questions of law and fact for juries to
decide while Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause issues are
considered legal questions for judges, alone, to resolve. Part IV does not
discover any principled reason for this distinction, but it does explain
that, while the original power of the jury in the American system waned
somewhat in the nineteenth century, the recent cases of Apprendi v. New
Jersey12 and United States v. Booker 13 reveal that the jury is again
amassing power in the United States. Part V delineates why the reasons
for the jury's earlier diminishment are unrelated to any differences
between obscenity and Punishments Clause questions. In fact, this Part
suggests that if either question is more appropriate for judges to decide,
it is the question of obscenity rather than the issue of unconstitutional
punishments. Part VI then questions whether procedural difficulties are
the reason for the disparate treatment. While juries are more readily
11. Professor Steven Croley stated that "[t]he majoritarian difficulty asks not how
unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to democracy, but rather
how elected/accountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to constitutionalism."
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 689, 694 (1995). This Article uses the term more broadly to refer to the concern that
popular rule overwhelms minority rights.
12. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
13. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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available for decisionmaking in obscenity cases, this Part asserts that
any inconvenience associated with involving juries in Punishments
Clause adjudications can be remedied with a few modifications to the
system and is no reason to ignore the constitutional salience of juries in
this context. Instead, juries should be considered essential in resolving
these questions, which are rooted in concerns of overreaching central
governments and predisposed judges. This Article concludes that juries
are well positioned to judge whether imposed, or even proposed,
sentences violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments and
offers some practical solutions for harnessing juries' acumen in
ascertaining society's moral values related to these constitutional
questions.
I. PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause provides that "cruel
and unusual punishments" shall not be inflicted.14 While the U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted this Clause differently throughout the
ages, since 1958 it has consistently held that the prohibition draws "its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."' 15 The Court has elaborated on the meaning of
the Clause over the past half-century and has erected a brittle
framework within which to decide these Punishment Clause cases.16
Under the first part of this framework, the Court examines various
objective indicia of contemporary values to determine whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual.17 The primary indicator of these values
is legislation adopted by the various U.S. states, the federal government,
the District of Columbia, and the U.S. military.' 8 The Court also
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
15. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
16. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419-20, 443-47 (2008) (suggesting
that assessing the evolving standards of decency involves examining the reliability of potential
testimony); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12, 321 (2002) (consulting the evolving
standards of decency in reaching the conclusion that it is unconstitutional to execute mentally
retarded individuals).
17. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 ("In these cases the Court has been guided by
'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice with respect to executions."' (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)));
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (referencing "objective indicia of consensus"); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312
(referencing "objective evidence of contemporary values" (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("We have pinpointed that the 'clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures."' (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331)). But cf Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2023 (2010) (stating that an examination of state legislative action "is incomplete and
unavailing"); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (suggesting that the actions of
2012]
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examines secondary sources that it considers reflective of contemporary
values. 19 These secondary sources include sentencin decisions of juries
and judges,2 ° the results of public opinion polls, 1 the opinions of
professional organizations,2 2  the laws of foreign nations, 23  and
international law.24 Finally, in the second part of its framework, the
Court draws on its own independent judgment to determine whether the
objective indicia of contemporary values are consistent with its own
views.25 Under this rubric, the Court often calls on its understanding of
whether the punishment at issue serves the purposes of retribution and
deterrence.
2 6
In some cases-most typically when the case does not involve the
death penalty-the Court varies its two-part framework somewhat in
juries are equally important). While the Court has been rather consistent in consulting legislative
action, it has been somewhat inconsistent in its analysis of this data. Compare Kennedy, 554
U.S. at 422-26 (determining that imposing the death penalty for the crime of child rape was
unconstitutional by focusing on the fact that only six states imposed the punishment), with
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16 (focusing on the "consistency of the direction of change" in the
number of states permitting the punishment).
19. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 588-89.
20. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 ("Actual sentencing practices are an important
part of the Court's inquiry into consensus."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) ("The
jury also is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so
directly involved." (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 439-40 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting))).
21. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35 (examining evidence from public opinion polls).
22. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting that the opinions of professional
organizations confirm that the legislative judgment reflects a broader professional consensus).
23. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 ("There is support for our conclusion in the fact
that, in continuing to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who did not commit
homicide, the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the world over."); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-76 (2005) (examining the laws of other nations).
24. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78 (examining international opinion); Atkins, 536
U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting that evidence, including that of international opinion, "makes it clear
that this legislative judgment reflects a much broader social ... consensus"). Whether the
Court's consultation of the actions and opinions of other nations, as well as international law, is
appropriate remains a topic of debate.
25. The actual significance of the Court's reliance on its own independent judgment
remains questionable. The Court claims that its own judgment is a factor in determining whether
a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, yet the Court has never found its own
judgment to compel a conclusion different from one it reached based on the objective indicia of
contemporary values. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 615-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court's resort to its independent judgment is a "rule... reflected solely in dicta and never once
in a holding that purports to supplant the consensus of the American people with the Justices'
views...."); William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 1355, 1380-81 (2005)
(arguing that "there is no case in which the majority's 'independent judgment' has diverged
from their conclusions about contemporary standards of decency," thus "[tihe public-sentiment
dog has wagged the tail of independent judicial judgment").
26. See Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 81,101 (2010).
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determining the constitutionality of a punishment. In Solem v. Helm,
27
for example, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a punishment of
life without the possibility of parole by examining whether the gravity of
the offense was grossly disproportionate to the harshness of the penalty,
whether other similarly situated defendants within the same jurisdiction
had received similar punishments, and whether other 2urisdictions
imposed commensurate punishments for similar crimes. The Court
referred to these factors as "objective" in nature,29 and indeed the latter
two factors are similar to the Court's consultation of state legislative
action and actual punishments imposed under its "objective indicia of
contemporary values" inquiry in its traditional Punishments Clause
analysis.30 Just as the Court tallies the number of jurisdictions that have
adopted or prohibited a particular punishment, and examines the
punishments juries have imposed, under its traditional analysis, the
Solem Court assessed the jurisdictions that imposed similar punishments
for similar crimes. 31 Under this alternative approach to the Punishments
Clause, though, the Court did not explicitly turn to its own independent
judgment, as it traditionally does. 32 Yet, its assessment of whether the
gravity of the offense was grossly disproportionate to the harshness of
the penalty was a matter of the Court's subjective judgment.33 While
"there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes"
27. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
28. See id. at 290-92 ("[A] court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii)
the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."); id. at 296-300
(applying these factors). Whether the Solem Court's approach is still binding law is somewhat
unclear after the Court's fragmented holdings in later noncapital Eighth Amendment cases. See
Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in this area is in "disarray"); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir.
1999) (stating that the Court's Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), "left the meaning of
Solem less than clear"). Compare, e.g., United States v. Nigg, 667 F.3d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 2012)
(referencing the Solem three-factor test); United states v. Gurule, 461 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir.
2006) (stating that the Solem Court "established a three-pronged analysis for reviewing Eighth
Amendment proportionality challenges, but subsequently.., the Court substantially narrowed
that approach and instructed that courts should not go beyond the first prong in most cases");
United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 247-50 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying Solem), with Norris,
622 F.3d at 1286 (stating that the Solem "approach was short-lived"); Hawkins, 20 F.3d at 1282
& n. 1 (explaining that the Solem proportionality test was narrowed in Harmelin as discussed by
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin).
29. Id. at 292.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
31. But see supra note 28 (explaining that the three-factor proportionality test may have
been narrowed after Solem).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
33. See id.
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as the Solem Court contended,34 there is little agreement as to actual or
weighted seriousness of these offenses.35 Accordingy, the Court must
engage in some line-drawing under this analysis. Ultimately, this
question of gross disproportionality is similar to the Court's turn to its
independent judgment under its traditional Punishments Clause
analysis.37 They both reduce to a question of whether imposing this
sentence on this offender is, in the Court's judgment, unacceptably
cruel.38
In contrast to this case-by-case approach 39  of gross
disproportionality that the Court has employed in noncapital cases, the
Court's traditional Punishments Clause analysis used in capital cases is
often categorical in nature. For example, in Atkins v. Virginia,40 the
Court concluded that it is unconstitutional to execute any individual
who is "mentally retarded, '41 not that it was unconstitutional to execute
the offender Daryl Renard Atkins due to his own incapacities.
42
34. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
35. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1832-37 (2007) (underscoring the difficulty in determining
cardinal ranking of punishments); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 49 Hous. L.
REV. 1047, 1062 (forthcoming 2012) (explaining that there is little agreement as to the cardinal
ranking of offenses).
36. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 295 (explaining that "[it is clear that a 25-year sentence
generally is more severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases it would be difficult to
decide that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not").
37. Although it is unclear whether the Solem Court's three-step approach to Punishments
Clause constitutionality is still controlling, see supra note 28, the question of gross
disproportionality, which mirrors the Court's traditional turn to its own judgment, remains good
law. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) ("The Eighth Amendment ... contains a
,narrow proportionality principle' that 'applies to noncapital sentences."').
38. Cf. Ryan, supra note 26 (explaining that the cruelty inquiry is related to the Court's
current resort to its own independent judgment in Punishments Clause analysis).
39. Cf. id. (comparing the Court's Punishments Clause gross disproportionality analysis to
Sixth Amendment speedy trial determinations, which are determined on a case-by-case basis).
40. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
41. While "mentally retarded" may be viewed as an offensive term, it is the term that the
Supreme Court has employed in this context. See id. passim; Ryan, supra note 26, at 93 n.59.
42. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (concluding that "the execution of mentally retarded
criminals ... is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the
State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender" (quoting Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986))). Interestingly, the Court's categorical approach in this, and other
Punishments Clause cases, is arguably contrary to the principle of judicial minimalism. Cf.
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947) (describing the Court's "policy
of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional cases," which includes its rule not to determine
constitutional matters "in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling
is to be applied"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT xi (1999) ("The current Supreme Court embraces minimalism. Indeed, judicial
minimalism has been the most striking feature of American law in the 1990s.").
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Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons,43 the Court concluded that it is
unconstitutional to execute any individual who was a juvenile when he
committed the crime at issue, not that it was unconstitutional to execute
the offender Christother Simmons in the case at hand for committing
first-degree murder. In contrast, in noncapital cases, the Court has
often taken a more fact-specific approach in its Punishments Clause
determinations. For example, in the Solem case, the Court determined
that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual for the crime of uttering
a "no account check" even though the defendant was a habitual offender
under state law, having previously been convicted three times of third-
degree burglary and also having been convicted of obtaining money
under false pretenses, grand larceny, and "third-offense driving while
intoxicated. 'A4 The Solem Court did not create a categorical rule, as it
did in Atkins and Roper, by, for example, concluding that heightened
sentences for habitual offenders in general are unconstitutional or even
that seventh-time nonviolent felons cannot constitutionally be sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Although the Court has historically based its varying Punishments
Clause analyses on this distinction between capital and noncapital cases,
the Court recently upset this distinction in Graham v. Florida.46 In that
case, the Court adopted a categorical approach-and its concomitant
reliance on objective indicia of contemporary values and the Court's
own independent judgment-to determine the constitutionality of the
punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a
crime that did not involve homicide.47 The Court's unexpected adoption
of the categorical approach in a noncapital case suggests that the Court
may be moving toward a more categorical jurisprudence in this area.
Accordingly, it seems that the Court may focus less on the specific facts
of a case and more on broad classifications of the crimes and offenders
at issue.
While the Court seems to be increasingly conforming to its
traditional reliance on the objective indicia of contemporary values and
the Court's own independent judgment, scholars have criticized this
two-part analysis that the Court employs as disingenuous.48
43. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
44. See id. at 578-79.
45. Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-81, 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A third offense
of driving while under the influence of alcohol [was] a felony" under state law. Id. at 280 n.4.
46. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
47. See id at 2017-18,2022-23.
48. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1089, 1091
(2006) ("Although justified in terms of deference to state legislatures, the reliance on state
legislation to prove a national consensus regarding the application of the Eighth Amendment
FLORIDA LA W REVIEW
Formalistically, the Court's reliance on its two-part "evolving standards
of decency" test seems to depend primarily on the notion of unusualness
in proscribing particular punishments under the Eighth Amendment.
49
This derives from the Court's systematic method of tallying the number
of jurisdictions that have adopted or rejected a particular practice.5 ° Yet
scholars have accused the Court of, in practice, relying solely, or at least
primarily, on its independent judgment in determining the
constitutionality of punishments. 51 They have said that this "shifts from
the people to the judiciary the powers to define the empirical limits of
personal liberty and equality" and is thus undemocratic. 52 Instead of
citizens determining what punishments are appropriate, the Court, a
"small and unrepresentative segment of our society," reserves this
power for itself.5 Further, scholars have described the Court's turn to
its own judgment as "suspect in terms of its sociological legitimacy,
which depends on the public perception that the Court is adhering to
principled legal norms."54 The perception that the Court does not adhere
to principled legal norms likely stems from its inconsistency in how it
reaches its independent-judgment determinations. In addition to the
theories of retribution and deterrence,55 the Court has relied on a
potpourri of other factors-such as the principle that the punishment of
does violence to constitutional federalism and imposes judicial preferences under the facade of
judicial modesty."); Mary Sigler, The Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRAM. L. 403, 415 (2011) (suggesting that the Court may be "clinging to majoritarian
considerations" in order to "mask" its "reliance on its own subjective judgment"); John F.
Stinneford, Evolving Away from Evolving Standards of Decency, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 87, 89
(2010) ("Going forward, the Supreme Court appears set to rely primarily on its own judgment in
all cases arising under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and to use the evolving
standards of decency test as little more than a prop."); see also, e.g., John F. Stinneford,
Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv.
899, 920-23 (2011) (asserting that the Court's reliance on its own independent judgment
"has... led to ajurisprudence that is standardless and disingenuous").
49. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 593 ("Regardless of whether the Court understands
cruelty and unusualness to be distinct concepts, the Court's application of its 'evolving
standards of decency' test appears to base its Punishments Clause inquiries primarily on the
ground of unusualness.").
50. See id.; supra text accompanying note 18.
51. See supra note 48.
52. Evelyn Keyes, Two Conceptions of Judicial Integrity: Traditional and Perfectionist
Approaches to Issues of Morality and Social Justice, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
233, 286-91 (2008); see also supra note 48 (noting criticisms of the Court's analysis).
53. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 17 (2005) (stating that the Court's reliance on its own judgment risks "judicial
hegemony and substantive indeterminacy").
54. Alford, supra note 53, at 17.
55. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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death is worse than other punishments available under the law, 56
defendants' competencies,57 the threat of wrongful execution,5 s and
even the reliability of certain pieces of evidence presented in the trial
court59 -in forming its judgment under this prong of the analysis. 60 This
inconsistency has led scholars to throw up their hands in exasperation
and has created an unpredictable Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 61
Regardless, the Court's independent judgment is central to
determinations of whether punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual. I have argued elsewhere that the text of the Punishments
Clause, as well as the Court's earliest cases, suggest that punishments
must be both cruel and unusual to be prohibited under the Clause.
62
Thus, the cruelty and unusualness components of the Clause must be
independently assessed to give full meaning to the prohibition. 63 The
Court's current practice of examining state sentencing practices
addresses the unusualness aspect of the prohibition, but independently
assessing the concept of cruelty is more difficult.64 Perhaps the Court
could do this by focusing its independent judgment more carefully on
the concept of cruelty and analyzing specific identified factors targeted
56. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 99-100.
57. Seeid. at 99, 117-18.
58. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 443 (2008) (expressing the Court's
concern about the 'special risk of wrongful execution' in some child rape cases" (quoting
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002))); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (stating that "[m]entally
retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution").
59. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 443 (expressing concern about "[t]he problem of unreliable,
induced, and even imagined child testimony" in capital cases).
60. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 99-119 (discussing a variety of factors upon which the
Court relies).
61. See, e.g., John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A
Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 Omo Sr. L.J. 71, 75 (2010) (stating that "[i]t has become
conventional wisdom that Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence is a mess"); Tom
Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 476 (2005)
("The Court's jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause stands in disarray."). These methodological difficulties are exacerbated by the Court's
inconsistency in its basic interpretation of the Punishments Clause. Frequently, the Court
interprets the prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" as a term of art, the meaning of
which is determined by the Court's reliance on the two-part "evolving standards of decency"
test. Occasionally, however, the Court has interpreted the Clause to more closely track the text
of the Eighth Amendment and has specified that a punishment must be both cruel and unusual to
be constitutionally prohibited. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 592-93; e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (rejecting an allegation of cruel and unusual punishment because,
while the punishment at issue "may [have been] cruel, [it was] not unusual in the constitutional
sense"). This latter interpretation is not only more consistent with the text of the Punishments
Clause, but it is also more consistent with how the language of the Clause was originally
interpreted. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 604-15.
62. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 605.
63. See id. at 601-04, 615.
64. See id. at 615-17; Ryan, supra note 26, at 120-21.
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at this idea.65 While more carefully focusing the Court's independent-
judgment analysis would be a relatively simple solution to impose, it
fails to solve the problem that judges tend not to be representative of
American society.6 While nearly 51% of Americans are female, for
example, only three of the nine current U.S. Supreme Court Justices, or
33%, are female, and only about 22% of the federal judiciary overall is
female. 67 Moreover, while 44% of the Justices are of a e sixty-five or
older, only 12.9% of Americans are sixty-five or older. And of course
the vast majority of judges are highly educated, having obtained juris
doctors, whereas less than a third of U.S. citizens have completed
college degrees.69 If judges are not representative of society, one must
ask whether they have other qualifications that make them competent to
define the contours of cruelty.
II. QUESTIONS OF MORALITY
Determining whether a punishment is cruel is in most estimations a
question of morality.70 Professor Michael Moore has explained that
65. See generally Ryan, supra note 26 (arguing that the Court should rein in its
independent-judgment analysis in the Punishments Clause context).
66. See supra text accompanying note 53.
67. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Table 7. Resident Population by
Sex and Age. 1980 to 2009, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/201 /tables/l Is0007.pdf
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012), with Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) and Federal
Judiciary Center, Biographical Directory of Judges, Fed. Judiciary Center, at
www.fjc.gov/hisory/home.nsf/page/judges.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). Further, while
about 16% of Americans are Hispanic, only about 6% of federal judges are Hispanic, and while
nearly 5% of Americans are of Asian descent, only about 1% of federal judges are Asian
American. Compare Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010, available at
www.census.gov/ prod/cen2OO/briefs/c2OlObr-02.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2012), with Federal
Judiciary Center, supra. The information on the federal judiciary was obtained by visiting the
Federal Judiciary Center's section on "Federal Judicial History": "Judges of the United States
Courts" and selecting research categories on "Gender" and "Race or Ethnicity" and limiting the
queries to sitting judges. Cf Pat K. Chew & Luke T. Kelley-Chew, The Missing Minority
Judges, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 179, 196 n.197 (employing similar searches by employing
the Federal Judiciary Center's resources).
68. Meaningful computations of the average age of federal judges is more complicated
because senior judges, who tend to be older, often handle fewer cases than active judges,
creating less of an impact.
69. See Educational Attainment by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1970 to 2010, available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12sO229.pdf.
70. See Laurence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which Moral Question
Does the Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 38 (2008) (noting that
cruelty, while somewhat ambiguous in meaning, "invites a moral inquiry"). See generally
Ronald J. Allen, Moral Choices, Moral Truth, and the Eighth Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 25, 30-31 (2008) (noting that "evolving standards" in the Eighth Amendment context can
be derived from subjective moral beliefs); Michael S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (2008) (examining the role of morality in Eighth
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there are various possible sources for morality-based judgments under
the Eighth Amendment.7' Judges may engage in first-person judgments
by relying on their own personal values;-7 they may rely on third-person
judgments, basing their decisions on what other groups of individuals
believe is morally correct; 73 or they may draw on both of these sources,
as the Court has traditionally done in its Punishments Clause
jurisprudence, by avowedly relying both on "objective indicia of
contemporary values" and its own independent judgment.74 Professor
Ronald Allen has argued, however, that there is no "truth value" to be
found in moral propositions and that judges have no greater insight into
moral values than anyone else does. 5 This suggests that judges' first-
person moralizing should be patrolled by society.76 But there are also
difficulties with judges engaging in third-person moralizing. Groups and
individuals often differ in their determinations of what is moral or
immoral and how is a judge to decide which group or individual is
correct?
7
That an issue of morality is at the core of a constitutional question,
as in the Punishments Clause context, is not unique; questions of
morality are implicit in other constitutional inquiries as well. Under the
constitutional requirements of substantive due process, for example,
moral values creep into questions such as whether abortion is a
constitutional right and whether sexual relations between individuals
Amendment jurisprudence). I have argued elsewhere, however, that the concept of cruelty as
enshrined in the Punishments Clause is actually more complicated, instead reflecting notions of
exceptional brutality and inflicting pain for a purpose other than punishment. See Ryan, supra
note 26, at 121-40. Identifying these factors might fall outside of the traditional boundaries of
moral reasoning, but they are still issues that juries are well situated to determine, as they are
heavily rooted in facts rather than purely in law.
71. See Moore, supra note 70, at 53-58.
72. Some commentators refer to this as "critical morality," but Professor Moore prefers to
refer to it as "committed, first-person judgments about morality." Id. at 53.
73. Professor Moore refers to this as "moral sociology." Id. at 53.
74. See id. at 53 ("Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg and Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Roper clearly distinguish these [first-person and third-person] sources of moral values, and in
fact use both first-person and third-person judgments quite explicitly. They have tried to make
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence a mixture of both kinds of moral reasoning.").
75. See Allen, supra note 70, at 28, 31.
76. See id. at 34 (explaining the need for citizens to patrol the judiciary).
77. Cf Moore, supra note 70, at 55-58 (examining some of the varying populations that a
judge could consult when engaging in third-person moralizing). Professor Moore explains that
judges could base their third-person moralizing on opinions held by "everyone in the world,"
"only English-speaking peoples," "citizens of the United States," or even a "subset of the United
States," such as our "ethical leaders." Id. at 56-57.
78. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-95 (1992) (holding
that the spousal notification provision of Pennsylvania's abortion statute was unconstitutional on
the ground that it imposed an "undue burden" on a woman's ability to procure an abortion, and
determining that other portions of the statute did not impose such an unconstitutional "undue
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of the same sex may constitutionally be criminalized.79 In determining
whether there has been a violation of one's substantive due process
right, the Court has asked whether there is "a deeply embedded moral
consensus" supporting that right.80 And scholars have debated whether
judges should engage in moral reasoning, or consult the principles of
natural law, in determining what is protected under substantive due
process guarantees. 81 However, in contrast to the debate on the question
of morality in the Eighth Amendment context, the discussion in the
substantive due process arena focuses more on whether judges should
enga e in moral reasoning at all, rather than on how they should engage
in it.8
burden"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that "[a] state criminal abortion
statute ... that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother,
without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is
violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
79. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), and striking down Texas's statute criminalizing homosexual conduct). For
further details on the story surrounding Lawrence v. Texas, see DALE A. CARPENTER, FLAGRANT
CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (forthcoming Mar. 2012).
80. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 947 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that some
"scholars maintain that the Court should recognize non-textual fundamental rights that are
supported by a deeply embedded moral consensus that exists in society" (citing Harry H.
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973))); see also Ryan, supra note 10, at 619-20
(exploring morality in the substantive due process context); e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-75
(examining the growing moral consensus that homosexual conduct should not be punished in
addition to exploring the nation's history of enacting laws "directed at homosexual conduct").
This question of moral values, however, is not the only question that the Court asks when
determining whether there has been a violation of substantive due process. In addition to this
question, it sometimes asks whether a right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see also Ryan,
supra note 10, at 619 (explaining the Court's reliance on history and morality in the substantive
due process context). The Court's jurisprudence in this area is quite convoluted, and it is
difficult to determine one distinctive test that the Court employs here. See Daniel 0. Conkle,
Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REv. 63, 121 (2006) (explaining the
Court's various approaches in the substantive due process context and suggesting that Lawrence
introduced a "distinctive theory of substantive due process, a theory of evolving national
values").
81. See Mattei Ion Radu, Incompatible Theories: Natural Law and Substantive Due
Process, 54 VILL. L. REv. 247, 279-84 (2009) (referencing scholars who have taken differing
positions on the role that natural law should play in substantive due process decisionmaking).
82. See Carlos A. Ball, Why Liberty Judicial Review is as Legitimate as Equality Review:
The Case of Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 16 (2011) ("One of the frequent
criticisms of substantive due process doctrine is that it encourages (or allows) judges to
incorporate into the constitutional analysis their personal views about the moral and policy
positions behind the legislation that is subject to challenge."); Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process
Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1543, 1545 (2008):
[T]he major fault line within the Court has long been between those who seek
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Morality is also at the heart of judgments on whether certain speech
is obscene and therefore completely unprotected by the First
Amendment. 83 Although the First Amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press,"84 the Court has determined that obscenity is not protected by the
First Amendment under any circumstances. 85  What constitutes
obscenity is not entirely clear though. Justice Potter Stewart famously
stated in 1964 that he simply "know[s] it when [he] see[s] it.' 6
Providing a bit more guidance, the Court in Miller v. California87
concluded that speech is obscene when (a) "'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; (b) "the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law"; and (c) "the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
88
Just like the question of cruelty in the Eighth Amendment context and
the question of "a deeply embedded moral consensus" under substantive
due process, each prong of the Miller test reduces to a question of
individuals' moral judgments. The first prong probes the community's
own current standards regarding the morality of the speech under
review,89 and the second prong, which deals with moral subject of
"patent[] offensive[ness]," has been clarified to similarly invoke
contemporary community standards. 90 The third prong of the Miller test,
while also drawing on a community's mores, examines the values of a
somewhat different community. Where the first and second prongs turn
to the local community for moral values, the third prong adopts a
broader, arguably national, community. 91 Although this community
to limit the reach of the Due Process Clause to rights that long-standing
traditions recognize as such, and those who believe either that evolving
traditions are what matter or that the Court legitimately brings its own moral
judgments to bear on substantive due process questions.
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84. Id.
85. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
86. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be [obscene]; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . .
87. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
88. Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
89. See id. at 24.
90. Id. at 30; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977) (explaining
that Miller makes clear that both the prurient interest and the patent offensiveness prongs are to
be determined based on "contemporary community standards").
91. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987); see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 301
("Literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.., is not discussed in Miller in terms of
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varies in form from the communities under the first two prongs, this
serious-value component of the Miller test is still based on society's
moral standards.
III. SIMILAR CONTEXTS, VARYING APPROACHES
Not only are the Court's First Amendment obscenity analysis and its
Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause analysis similar in that they
involve delving into questions of morality, but they both also explicitly
examine evolving societal norms in a way that the Court's substantive
due process analysis does not.92 Certainly, there has been debate for
centuries over whether constitutional interpretation should yield to
contemporary community standards."); cf Obscenity, 87 HARV. L. REv. 160, 169 (1973) ("Some
measure of close appellate supervision may be retained after Miller since it appears that only
prurient appeal and patent offensiveness will be determined under state standards, while 'serious
value' apparently will be measured by national standards."). The Court has stated that this
broader community's values are to be determined by the standard of an objective reasonable
person. See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01; Scot A. Duvall, A Callfor Obscenity Law Reform, I WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 83-84 (1992). As the Miller Court explained, "[t]he First Amendment
protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious... value, regardless of whether the
government or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent." 413 U.S. at
34. Therefore, "the value of the work [should not] vary from community to community based on
the degree of local acceptance it has won." Pope, 481 U.S. at 500. Instead, the Court determined
that the relevant standard to be applied in determining the serious value of a work is "whether a
reasonable person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole." Id. at 501.
Commentators have concluded that this means an objective, national standard should be applied
when determining the serious value of a work. See, e.g., Jack E. Brown, New Law for the
Internet, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1243, 1250 n.53 (1996) ("The third element (frequently referred to as
the 'redeeming social value' test) has been declared to be an objective test based on national
standards."); David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual
Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 112 n.6 (1994) ("In Pope v. Illinois,... the Court held that
in judging whether a work has 'serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,' the Court
must apply a national 'reasonable person' standard."); Duvall, supra, at 87 ("[Flor the serious
value prong, the Supreme Court assumed a generic, arguably national, community of
'reasonable persons' who have objective standards.... As a matter of constitutional law, the
contemporary community standard for the value of a specific work must be the same throughout
the United States."). Whether the work has serious value, as determined by the objective
standard of the national community's mores, is to be decided by a local jury. See Miller, 413
U.S. at 26 & n.9 (explaining that "we must continue to rely on the jury system" and noting that
"[tihe mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the same material does not mean
that constitutional rights are abridged"); see also Edward John Main, The Neglected Prong of
the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or Scientific Value, 11 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 1159, 1161 (1987) (stating that Miller "suggest[s] that the determination of the value of a
work should be left to the jury .. "); PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT 141 (2008), available at http://federalcriminaljuryinstructions
.com/uploads/IstCircuitCriminalInstructions_2008_Revision.pdf (including in the model
instructions for an offense involving obscenity the elements of the Miller test).
92. While the First and Eighth Amendment analyses focus on evolving or contemporary




changing societal norms.93 Simply put, most constitutional interpreters
are considered either originalists or living constitutionalists (or
nonoriginalists) in some form.94 Originalists tend to privilege history in
their interpretations of the Constitution, whereas living constitutionalists
do not privilege history and tend to favor interpretations of the
document that evolve with changing society.95 Some Supreme Court
Justices have endorsed particular methods of constitutional
interpretation. Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, is well known for
his "faint-hearted" originalism.96 However, the Supreme Court as a
whole has not endorsed any overall method of constitutional
interpretation.97 Instead, many of its cases vary in the constitutional
93. See LACKLAND H. BLOOM., JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: How THE SUPREME
COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION xx (2009) (explaining that various methods of constitutional
interpretation have been used "throughout our constitutional history").
94. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292-
93 (2007) (describing the debate between originalists and living constitutionalists and asserting
that the choice between the two camps is a false one); Marc 0. DeGirolami, The Vanity of
Dogmatizing, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 201, 217 (2010) ("The major competitor to originalism of
whatever variety has generally gone under the name of 'nonoriginalism' or 'living
constitutionalism."'). See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L.
REv. 849 (1989) (setting forth the dichotomy between originalism and nonoriginalism). Of
course asserting that originalism and living constitutionalism, or nonoriginalism, are the two
(major) methods of constitutional interpretation is greatly oversimplifying the matter. Scores of
books and articles have been devoted to chasing down various species and nuances of
constitutional interpretation, and this Article will not even attempt to summarize the vast
scholarly literature on the subject. For a good taxonomy of major methods of constitutional
interpretation, however, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982).
95. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010) ("A 'living constitution'
is one that evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, without being formally
amended."); DeGirolami, supra note 94, at 217-18 (distinguishing living constitutionalists from
originalists).
96. Scalia, supra note 94, at 864 ("1 hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-
hearted originalist.").
97. See BLOOM, supra note 93, at xviii-xix ("More often than not, the Court relies on a
variety of interpretive techniques in reaching its decision."). Professor Lackland Bloom has
explained that:
It is rare.., for the Court to rely on only one methodology in deciding a major
case. All of these methods of interpretation have long been and continue to be
influential because they can be quite persuasive. In explaining why a case has
been decided in a particular manner, in criticizing a decision in a dissenting
opinion, or in defending an opinion against such criticism, a justice will almost
certainly use every weapon available. Thus, it is not uncommon for an opinion
to rely on a variety of different interpretive methods, to the point where it is
difficult-if not impossible-to attribute the result to any particular approach.
Id. at 419.
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methods used--even within the same areas of law. In most instances,
the Court ties itself to its legal doctrines and precedents, and many of
these are not specifically rooted in any particular method of
constitutional interpretation." The Court's frameworks for analysis in
the areas of First Amendment obscenity and Eighth Amendment
Punishments Clause law, though, are atypical in that they are more
securely tethered to a particular method of constitutional interpretation.
By focusing on "community standards" in the obscenity context, and
"evolving standards" in the Eighth Amendment context, 1°° the Court's
primary standards for constitutionality in these contexts seem to be tied
to a notion of living constitutionalism rather than rooted in history as
many originalists would prefer. This is apart from whether following a
living-constitutional approach is best in these contexts. And the
community and evolving standards of the Court's First and Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence do not mean that Justices and judges do not
still root their First and Eighth Amendment analyses in their own
methods of constitutional interpretation. The faint-hearted originalist
Justice Scalia, for example, routinely discusses the original meaning of
the Punishments Clause in his opinions in these types of cases. 10 1
Although the Court's approaches in obscenity and Punishments
Clause cases are similar in that the' address moral questions and
account for society's changing values,' 2 the Court probes these notions
of cruelty and obscenity differently in these varying contexts. In
98. Seeid. at419.
99. See id. at xix-xx (explaining that the Court's reliance on different methods of
interpretation often does not dictate the results the Court reaches).
100. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also supra text
accompanying note 15.
101. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing in
support of the constitutionality of the death penalty the fact that "[t]he same Congress that
proposed the Eighth Amendment also enacted the Act of April 30, 1790, which made several
offenses punishable by death"); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority's opinion, which held unconstitutional the execution of
juvenile offenders, reaches an implausible result by failing to properly rely on the original
meaning of the Eighth Amendment and instead relying on the evolving standards of decency
and concluding that "the Constitution has changed").
102. In addition to resting on moral determinations and directly appealing to evolving
constitutional standards, First Amendment obscenity and Eighth Amendment Punishments
Clause jurisprudence share "a special historical tie" because the horrific punishments that
prompted the 1689 English Bill of Rights prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, which
in turn inspired the Founders to place the nearly identical prohibition in our own Bill of Rights,
were inflicted on individuals criticizing the British government. AKRHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 82 (1998). For example, it was not uncommon in
early Britain for political dissenters convicted of treason to "be hanged by the neck," be cut
down while still alive, have their "privy-members ... cut off," and have their bowels removed
and burned. See id. Then, the dissenters, who would still be alive, would have their heads cut
off, their bodies cut into quarters, and then these pieces disposed of. See id.
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criminal Punishments Clause cases, 103 courts consider the issue of
cruelty-the moral question involved-to be a question of law.'
0 4
Accordingly, courts take it upon themselves to determine whether a
103. Interestingly, the issue of cruel and unusual punishment is treated as a mixed question
of law and fact for the jury to decide in civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases. An example model jury
instruction for such a claim provides that the plaintiff has established excessive use of force
under the Eighth Amendment if he has proved all of the following elements:
First, the defendant [here describe an act such as "struck, hit, or kicked"]
the plaintiff, and
Second, the use of such force was excessive and applied maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm; land not in a good faith effort
to achieve a legitimate purpose;] and
Third, as a direct result, the plaintiff was damaged, and
[Fourth, the defendant was acting under color of state law.]
In determining whether the force[, if any,] was excessive, you must
consider such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used[,] [and] the extent of
the injury inflicted[, and whether the force was used to achieve a legitimate
purpose or wantonly for the very purpose of causing harm]. "Maliciously"
means intentionally injuring another without just cause or reason. "Sadistically"
means engaging in extreme or excessive cruelty or delighting in cruelty.
If any of the above elements has not been proved, then your verdict must be
for the defendant.
MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT § 4.30 (2011), available at http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/civ-manual_2
01 l.pdf.
104. See, e.g., State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 267 (Neb. 2008) ("The ultimate issue,
whether electrocution violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, presents a question of law."); State v. Berhanu, 724 N.W.2d 181, 183 (S.D. 2006)
("Whether a sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of our state and federal constitutions is a
question of law reviewed de novo."); State v. Hahn, 618 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Wis. 2000) (stating
that whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment is a "question of law"); State v. Lee,
439 S.E.2d 547, 571 (N.C. 1994) ("Whether a sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment
is a question of law and is therefore not a question to be resolved by a jury."). But cf State v.
Gomez, 235 P.3d 1203, 1207-10 (Kan. 2010) (suggesting that, after Graham v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2011 (2010), Eighth Amendment categorical questions are questions of law whereas Eighth
Amendment term-of-years questions may not so clearly be pure questions of fact); State v.
Webb, 750 A.2d 448, 453 (Conn. 2000) (describing the cruel and unusual punishment issue as
"a mixed question of law and fact," but concluding that it is "subject to independent review by
[the] court" and that the appellate court has "plenary review of the trial court's conclusions of
law... and the ultimate question of the constitutionality of [the punishment]" in this context
(citation omitted)). As suggested earlier, it is really often the question of cruelty and
unusualness that the Court addresses and thus treats as a matter of law. Cf supra text
accompanying notes 62-66.
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punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.10 5 In contrast, in
obscenity cases, courts consider the moral questions-whether the work
appeals to the prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and lacks serious value-to be mixed ones of law and
fact.l°6 Accordingly, in cases in which the defendant has elected to have
a jury trial, the jury resolves these important First Amendment
questions. 10 7 Thus, a jury will assess the local community's standards
on whether the work appeals to the prurient interest and describes
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. It will also assess the
national community's standards regarding the value of the work. The
jury's focus on the facts in assessing these issues suggests that the jury's
determinations will be tailored to the specific case at bar, achieving a
measure of individualization. Because the moral question of cruelty in
the Punishments Clause context is instead often determined as a
question of law at the appellate level, it cannot be similarly fact-
focused, and the same measure of individualization cannot be reached in
this context. This perhaps explains why the Supreme Court has been
moving toward a more categorical approach in its Punishments Clause
105. See, e.g., Berhanu, 724 N.W.2d at 186 (concluding that the defendant's "argument
that his sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment is without merit"); Hahn, 618
N.W.2d at 530, 536-37 (concluding that Wisconsin's "persistent repeater penalty enhancer," as
applied, does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
106. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (stating that "[iun resolving the
inevitably sensitive questions of fact and law" in the obscenity context, the Court "must
continue to rely on the jury system"); George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact,
87 Nw. U. L. REv. 14, 38-39 (1992) (explaining that determining whether a work is obscene is a
"mixed question[] of law and fact"); J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the
Jury, 65 B.U. L. REv. 483, 508 (1985) (explaining that lower courts determine community
standards in the obscenity context as "a mixed question of law and fact"). The Court has
muddied the waters somewhat by more recently referring to the serious value question as a
question of law, see, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 579 (2002), but it seems that the
Court, in suggesting this, was referring to the fact that serious value is a mixed question of law
and fact and that there is perhaps a greater role for appellate court review with respect to the
serious value prong. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997) ("This 'societal value'
requirement.., allows appellate courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the
definition by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor for socially redeeming value."); see also
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 579 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 873). Today, lower courts still treat the
serious value prong as a mixed question of law and fact for the jury.
107. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. For example, model jury instructions in Florida lay for
jurors the three-prong Miller test and also provide them with definitions of "prurient interest"
and "patently offensive." See Standard Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases § 24.1, Florida S.
Ct., available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/juryinstructions/instructions.shtml (last
visited Mar. 18, 2012). Similarly, the model jury instructions used in Connecticut provide jurors
with the Miller test requirements and also define for them various terms to more easily apply the
test to the facts at hand. See Criminal Jury Instructions § 7.4-1, State of Conn. Jud. Branch, Dec.
1, 2007, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part7/7.4-1.htm.
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adjudications; 10 8 it is not well situated to make fact-intensive Eighth
Amendment determinations when relying on trial court records that may
not have even addressed the issue.
Along with the increased individualization in the First Amendment
context comes a lesser degree of uniformity on the matter of obscenity
throughout the nation, which some scholars have bemoaned under the
Miller jury decisionmaking standard. 109 One scholar has explained that
the Constitution symbolizes our collective values as a nation, and
permitting these values to vary among communities undermines
"respect for and confidence in the document" and creates "[u]ncertainty
and discontent."110 Another has reasoned that the values of "choice and
diversity" that are embraced by the Miller standard are not desirable
"when it comes to fundamental rights" because these rights are
"supposed to be enjoyed equally by all citizens."''' Despite these
concerns, however, scholars have argued that such "geographical
constitutional nonuniformity" is valuable in our system and is not
uncommon under our Constitution.' 12 As Professor Mark Rosen has
articulated, political liberalism dictates that some communities "be
permitted to opt out of the general culture and govern themselves
subject to only minimal constraints."1 13 To deny these subcultures the
ability to self-govern so that they can self-actualize is to deprive them of
their basic liberties.1 4 In addition to uniformity concerns, there is the
fear that allowing local juries to determine constitutional norms-as in
the obscenity context-undercuts the purpose of the Bill of Rights to
108. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
109. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Personalizing First Amendment Jurisprudence: Shifting
Audiences & Imagined Communities to Determine Message Protection in Obscenity, Fighting
Words, and Defamation, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 443 (2009) (stating that such
nonuniformity "obliterates the notion of equality in First Amendment application"); Adam
Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REv. 153, 183 (2009) (questioning the propriety
of a standard that results in nonuniformity).
110. Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv. 929, 940-41 (1982).
111. Winkler, supra note 109, at 183.
112. Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of
Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1129, 1132-33, 1149-66
(1999) (asserting that "geographical nonuniformity of constitutional requirements and
proscriptions is a mainstay of American constitutionalism"); see also, e.g., Angela R. Riley,
Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLuM. L. REv. 1049, 1065 (2007) (arguing that "Good Native
governance requires the freedom of exit, which has long been considered 'a bedrock liberal
value"').
113. Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1056
(1998).
114. See id. at 1089-1106. To be sure, Professor Mark Rosen's assertion refers to the self-
government of particular cultural groups, such as the Mormons or the Oneida, see id. at 1063-
89, but his argument could be easily extended to the local communities represented by juries.
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protect minorities from the tyranny of majorities. Indeed, the Miller
standard is "patently majoritarian" by virtue of its ascertainment by a
jury applying primarily community standards.' 1 5 The concern of an
overreaching majority can be traced back to at least James Madison's
outline of checks and balances in The Federalist No. 51, where he stated
that "[i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part."' 6 This view of the
structure of our federal government has been widely adopted with
respect to the role of the Bill of Rights.117 For example, in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, Justice Robert Jackson notably
asserted that "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities."' 18
It is questionable whether leaving the question of obscenity to
judges rather than juries would remedy this majoritarian concern. As
Professor Barry Friedman and others have argued, courts in general are
"relatively majoritarian."" 9 Judicial decisions rely on majoritarian
sources such as the state polling that we see in the Punishments Clause
context 12 and vague references to democratic or American values.'
2 1
Further, the results embodied in judicial decisions-in even the most
controversial cases-have generally received a majority, or at least a
significant plurality, of public support.' 22 And the judiciary is held
115. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 605 n.136
(1993).
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
117. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
583 (1978) (stating that the judicial branch has the role of "protect[ing] dissenters from a
majority's tyranny").
118. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that,
although "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts ... the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the
interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities"
(citation omitted)); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132 (1991) (stating that the dominant modem approach to reading the Bill of Rights is to view
it as "vest[ing] individuals and minorities with substantive rights against popular majorities").
119. Friedman, supra note 115, at 586. Professor Friedman notes that it would be difficult
to detennine that courts are actually majoritarian, due in part to the difficulty of whether the
government, itself, is actually majoritarian. See id. Professor Friedman instead asserts that
"courts do not trump majority will, or remain unaccountable to majority sentiment, nearly to the
extent usually depicted." Id. He claims that, "[m]easured by a realistic baseline of
majoritarianism, courts are relatively majoritarian." Id.
120. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
121. See Friedman, supra note 115, at 590-607.
122. See id. at 607-09. Again, Professor Friedman qualifies his assertion with the caveat
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accountable to the majority through either elections or political
appointment, which is also majoritarian in nature.123
Even though majoritarianism may be a concern with the work of
both judges and juries, the history of the Bill of Rights suggests that
critics have overstated this issue. In juxtaposition to commentators'
emphasis on the countermajoritarian function of the document,
examining the legal and political landscapes during the time of the
Founding indicates that the original purpose of the Bill of Rights was
not to "vest individuals and minorities with substantive rights against
popular majorities,"'124 but was instead to advance the principles of
populism, federalism, and local autonomy that were already enshrined
in the Constitution prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights.' 2 The
drafting of the Bill of Rights was prompted by the Anti-Federalists'
concern that the framing of the Constitution presaged a loss in state
sovereignty. 126 Although many of the Anti-Federalists conceded that
there was a need for a stronger federal government, they were
concerned that the Constitution failed to limit federal powers and
provided the scaffolding for an overreaching and tyrannical federal
government.! 27 The Bill of Rights was proposed to safeguard state
sovereignty and to entrust the states to protect their individual citizens'
liberties. 12
that, "[a]s with legislatures, precisely measuring the congruity between judicial and public views
is difficult." Id. at 607. He also provides the interesting example that "the Court seems to have
followed [public opinion]" where the death penalty is at issue. Id. at 608. Although the Court's
quintessential opinion in this area, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972), in which
the court struck down the nation's death penalty statutes, "appears not to have garnered majority
support," Professor Friedman explains that the case "was decided at a time when public support
for the death penalty was near its lowest point ever." id. at 608-09. It "thus kicked off an
experiment-a test of American sentiment," and "[als polls have increasingly show[n] stronger
support for the death penalty, the Court has eliminated procedural hurdles to its imposition." Id.
at 609.
123. See Friedman, supra note 115, at 609-14. Professor Friedman emphasizes that it is the
judiciary as a whole, rather than individual judges, that are most important "for matters of
serious public moment." Id. at 613.
124. AMAR, supra note 102, at xii.
125. See id. at xii-xiii, 97 (introducing his interpretation that the Bill of Rights was
originally meant to empower popular majorities and deploy the "organizational structure and
democratic self-governance" of the Constitution); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original
Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the Founders' Search for a Workable Balance
Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1261, 1262 (1989) ("(T]he historical
record establishes that the Bill of Rights was originally intended to protect the states and their
respective citizens from undue federal interference.").
126. See Wilmarth, supra note 125, at 1281 (explaining that the purpose of drafting the Bill
of Rights was "to secure the people's liberty" by preserving state sovereignty).
127. See id. at 1276-84.
128. See id. at 1281. Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. has explained that:
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The primary tool that the Bill of Rights employs to safeguard state
sovereignty is that of the local jury. "[A]t the heart of the Bill of
Rights,"' 2  the jury is found in the Fifth Amendment's provision for a
grand jury in certain criminal cases,' 30  the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a petit jury in criminal cases, 13 1 and even the Seventh
Amendment's right to be tried by a jury in particular civil cases.' 32 A
The Antifederalists focused on the reservation of state powers and rights for
two reasons. First, the states, and not the distant federal government, were
considered to be the true guardians of the people's rights. Second, the Articles
of Confederation had followed the proper federal policy by reserving to the
states all questions regarding individual liberties and all other powers not
expressly granted to the Confederation Congress.
Id.
129. See AMAR, supra note 102, at 83, 96, 108 (stating that "ji]uries... were at the heart of
the Bill of Rights"; that "[i]f we seek a paradigmatic image underlying the original Bill of
Rights, we cannot go far wrong in picking the jury"; and that "ji]uries stood at the center of the
original Bill of Rights" ).
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger...."); see also AMAR, supra note 102, at 83 ("The Fifth Amendment
safeguarded the role of the grand jury .... ").
131. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law .. ");
see also AMAR, supra note 102, at 83 (stating that the Sixth Amendment safeguarded the role of
"the criminal petit jury"). Of course, the meaning of the Bill of Rights might be interpreted
differently today when its provisions are applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
cf. Amar, supra note 124, at 1134-36 (explaining how the Supreme Court's focus on striking
down state, rather than federal, laws as violating the Constitution has obscured the Bill of
Rights' original focus on "protecting a majority of the people from a possibility unrepresentative
government" and redirected it toward "protecting vulnerable minorities from dominant social
majorities"), which was ratified during a time when the power of juries was greatly diminished,
see supra text accompanying notes 156-76. To this extent, some readers may find the early
practices of juries irrelevant to proper Eighth Amendment interpretations, applications, and
practices. Several Supreme Court Justices, though, often invoke the original meaning or
understanding of the Eighth Amendment in analyzing Punishments Clause issues. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2044 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for departing from the original meaning of the Punishments Clause in interpreting it to
proscribe grossly disproportionate punishments); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 469
(2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's determination that executing an
individual for the crime of child rape is unconstitutional in part because the "holding is not
supported by the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment"); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88
(2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing in support of the constitutionality of the death penalty the
fact that "[t]he same Congress that proposed the Eighth Amendment also enacted the Act of
April 30, 1790, which made several offenses punishable by death").
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
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body consisting of ordinary citizens, the jury was meant to protect
individuals from an overreaching new federal government and its
brigade of judges and prosecutors. 33 After all, the Founding generation
had experienced firsthand the perils of a too-powerful government, and
this is the reason the Founders had drafted the Declaration of
Independence just over a decade earlier.134
State sovereignty was of utmost concern to the Anti-Federalists in
the area of criminal law, 135 and the local jury was therefore of particular
importance in this context. The Bill of Rights' limitation on searching
citizens' homes, ensuring a right against self-incrimination, and
guaranteeing the right to trial in criminal cases, among other rights,
were all designed to make it difficult for the federal government to
interfere with state systems of criminal justice. 136 It therefore makes
sense that these limitations are complemented by the Bill's guarantees
of criminal juries in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 137 In
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law."); see also AMAR, supra note 102, at 83 (stating that the Seventh
Amendment safeguarded the role of "the civil jury").
133. See AMAR, supra note 102, at 84 (stating that "the jury played a leading role in
protecting ordinary individuals against governmental overreaching" and that "the jury could
thwart overreaching by powerful and ambitious prosecutors and judges").
134. See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (setting forth the
colonists' complaints against the British crown).
135. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments 50
(Aug. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-=1875868 ("A
primary concern.. . of the Anti-Federalists was the continuing prerogative of the States to set
their own parameters of crime and punishment.").
136. See id. at 53 ("The point of the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights
was not to reliably convict the guilty and acquit the innocent but to make it extremely difficult
for the federal government to use the machinery of criminal justice at all."); George C. Thomas
III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers 'Bill of Rights and Criminal
Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 160 (2001) ("The principal concern in the Bill of Rights was
not to protect innocent defendants. The Framers instead intended to create formidable obstacles
to federal investigation and prosecution of crime.").
137. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text; see also Mannheimer, supra note
135, at 54 (opining that juries are central to the Bill of Rights because they are better than judges
at "channeling the moral sensibilities of the community in order to nullify unjust laws, judging
the character of their neighbors as defendants, accusers, and witnesses, adapting generally-
applicable law to idiosyncratic local conditions, and providing an opportunity for active civic
engagement by the ordinary citizen"). One might argue that the specific mention of juries in the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and the absence of such a reference in the Eighth Amendment,
suggests that juries are not the appropriate decisionmakers in the Eighth Amendment context.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, however, provide broad jury rights that could be seen to
extend beyond those specific Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Moreover, the First Amendment, pursuant to which the jury has been integrated into
decisionmaking, also does not specifically reference juries. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Nor does
the Bill of Rights suggest whether judge or jury is the default decisionmaker. However, history
suggests that juries were originally charged with making both factual and legal determinations.
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essence, the jury's role of acting as a bulwark between the people of the
states and the federal government was essential to the conception of
criminal law under the Constitution and its Amendments.
Not only does the Anti-Federalists' focus on safeguarding state
sovereignty and the jury relate to the majoritarian concern of the
prominent role of the jury under Miller, but it also relates to critics'
concerns of nonuniformity under jury determinations of constitutional
questions. 138 Due to the importance of the jury under the Anti-
Federalists' vision, some nonuniformity in constitutional determinations
was anticipated, and even embraced by some.' 39 The colonists had
become accustomed to variations in the law, and, as one commentator
of this era proclaimed, it would be "[i]n vain [to] attempt... to
establish an uniform authority and obligation of the.., law."'140 The
Anti-Federalists did not anticipate that the Bill of Rights would bring
uniformity to this kaleidoscopic legal landscape-even on issues of
constitutional magnitude. 141
This history of the Bill of Rights, together with the fact that jury
determinations are not dependent on the moral whims of generally
unrepresentative judges, suggests that the Miller approach of allowing
juries to determine constitutional moral questions has merit. This raises
the question, then, of why moral issues are characterized as questions of
law in the Punishments Clause context but as mixed questions of law
and fact in the obscenity context. Perhaps a look at the history of how
this country has addressed questions of law versus questions of fact and
mixed questions of law and fact will provide some insight into this
distinction.
See infra Part IV.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 109-111.
139. See Mannheimer, supra note 135, at 55.
140. Id. at 60-61 (quoting ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH
NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, at app. E 405 (1803)). In 1812, the
Supreme Court characterized the common law as "varying in every state in the Union." United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
141. Further, as Professor Akhil Amar points out, this same uniformity concern could be
expressed with respect to Article III judicial review of 1800. See AMAR, supra note 102, at 101.
"Through its power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, Congress
could vest the last word in constitutional cases in lower federal courts who, like juries, might
disagree among themselves.". Id. Moreover, "under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear [the famous Callender case, which dealt with the issue of
whether a jury has the right to refuse to follow a law it deems unconstitutional] ... [t]he most
important constitutional issue of the Federalist era." Id. at 98-101.
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IV. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE JURY AND ITS DEMISE
Historically, juries have been trusted to decide issues like Eighth
Amendment cruelty that we might today consider questions of law.
142
The American criminal law system derived, in large part, from its
English ancestor.143 The English iury was formally a body charged with
determining the facts of a case. But as one commentator explains,
English jurors often manipulated the facts of a case to acquit defendants
whom the jurors determined were not deserving of the harsh
punishments of the day. 145 The Founders actually provided American
juries with greater formal powers than the English jurors enjoyed. 14
6
Early American jurors were not only charged with fact-finding, as their
English ancestors were, but they were also informed that they had the
power, and the right, to determine the law in the case at hand.' 47 For
example, in the 1794 U.S. Supreme Court case of Georgia v.
Brailsford,148 the Court explicitly stated that a jury has "a right ... to
determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.,
149
The American jury's power began to wane somewhat around the
beginning of the nineteenth century. 150 Prior to this time, American
society was rather simple and the reigning law relatively provincial.' 51
Americans drew much of their law from England, but written legal
opinions were practically nonexistent, 152 and there were no treatises on
American law until 1803.153 At least one commentator has described
142. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582,
583-84 (1939).
143. See Chris Kemmitt, Function Over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury's Historical
Role as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 93, 101 (2006) (stating that "the role of
American juries was substantially influenced by eighteenth century British practices," but noting
that "the colonists did not adopt Anglo practices wholesale").
144. Seeid. at98.
145. See id. at 98-100.
146. See id. at 103-07; Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American
Jury, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 377, 387 ("In many ways, the colonial jury was vested with a law-
finding function greater than that possessed by its English counterpart.").
147. See Kemmitt, supra note 143, at 102-04, 106-07.
148. 3 U.S. I (Dall.) (1794).
149. Id. at 4. This historical antecedent should not be confused with the still-present
phenomenon of jury nullification. Jurors today retain the power to interpret the law in
accordance with their own beliefs, but they arguably lack the right to do so, whereas the
Brailsford Court provided juries with not only the power to interpret law, but also the right to do
so. See Jonathan Lahn, The Demise of the Law-Finding Jury in America and the Birth of
American Legal Science: History and Its Challenge for Contemporary Society, 57 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 553, 556, 559 (2009).
150. See Lahn, supra note 149, at 556.
151. See id at 569.
152. Pennsylvania, however, had been publishing legal opinions since 1806. See id. at 570.
153. See id. at 554 n.2.
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this period as a time of anarchy within the legal system that caused a
growing mistrust in the tyrannical powers of the democratic majorities
embodied in juries.154 This, it has been said, led to the deterioration of
the jury's power in determining questions of law.155 Another scholar has
argued that this period was not anarchy but instead just constituted a
different kind of rule of law-a more "ephemeral" law that was the
product of juror consensus in a particular case.1 56 Regardless, the legal
milieu in America soon began to change. Influenced by William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England and the focus on
values associated with the rationality and scientific reasoning of the
Enlightenment, American legal thinkers began working to create a more
systematized legal landscape. 157 This involved the drafting of written
legal opinions and treatises, as well as the promulgation of rules of
evidence and procedure.' 58 Along with this growing complexity of the
legal field, lawyers and judqes began increasingly taking advantage of
legal training and education. This led to a more professionalized legal
environment, and judges and lawyers, who had become competent
experts in the field, began taking greater control in the courtroom. 60 As
the complexity of the law grew, the average citizen gradually became
less able to understand the law and had to instead rely on these legal
professionals. 16 1 With this growing inability of lay individuals to
understand the law, trust in the average juror declined as well. 16 2 Not
154. See Letter from James Kent to Thomas Washington, in MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF
JAMES KENT 118 (William Kent ed., 1898) (observing that "English authority did not stand very
high in those early feverish times"); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 8
(1975) ("As unity and stability broke down near the turn of the century, the jury system began to
function less efficiently and with less certainty and predictability."); Lahn, supra note 149, at
567.
155. See NELSON, supra note 154, at 8 (noting that "[t]he needs of business
entrepreneurs ... changed the legal system by depriving juries in civil cases of their right to
decide the law"); Harrington, supra note 138, at 397-98, 414-15, 427-28 (describing colonists'
"desire to escape the vagaries of state court juries" and gain some stability within both the civil
and criminal law); Lahn, supra note 149, at 567-68.
156. See Lahn, supra note 149, at 567.
157. See id. at 570-72.
158. See id.
159. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 419-20 (1999); Matthew Tulchin, Note, An Analysis
of the Development of the Jury's Role in a New York Criminal Trial, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 425, 463-
66(2005).
160. See Harrington, supra note 146, at 380, 432; Tulchin, supra note 159, at 463-66.
161. See Tulchin, supra note 159, at 463-66.
162. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 916 (1994); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-




only did jurors lack the professionalized knowledge of law, but as
society grew more confident in the newly formed republican
government of the United States, jurors were viewed as undermining a
government that was more representative of the people. 163 Jurors were
no longer seen as a necessary bulwark between individuals and their
government. 164 Moreover, the growth in America during this era has
been said to have caused societal breakdown in terms of the people's
unity on issues such as ethics and economics. 165 So not only were jurors
viewed as incompetent and untrustworthy, but the inconsistency among
different jurors' values led to significant unpredictability in jury
verdicts, which was understood as harmful to business interests and the
country's economic growth. 166 As a result, American industrialists
exerted pressure to constrain juries' powers. 67
Scholars dispute the extent to which any of these, or other,' factors
contributed to the demise of the jury's power in the United States, but it
is undisputed that before the century's end, the jury had lost a
significant quantum of its original power. In 1895, the Supreme Court
officially divested the federal jury of its right to decide legal
questions.168 In Sparfv. United States, it stated that:
Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the
principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of
right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court
and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system,
the principal function of the judge would be to preside and
keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would
determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property
according to such legal principles as in their judgment were
163. See NELSON, supra note 154, at 8.
164. See Harrington, supra note 146, at 438.
165. See id. As Professor William Nelson stated:
[A] jury system in which juries have power to find law can function only in a
society with substantial ethical unity and economic and social stability. As
unity and stability broke down near the turn of the century, the jury system
began to function less efficiently and with less certainty and predictability.
Certainty and predictability, however, were the very qualities that business
entrepreneurs needed most in order to rationally allocate resources for
economic growth, and they accordingly began to complain about the jury
system's inefficiencies. As a result, juries lost their power to find law.
Id.
166. See id.
167. One scholar argues that the passage of the Civil War Amendments was also
responsible for transforming a law-and-fact-deciding jury into one with the right to decide only
questions of fact. See Tulchin, supra note 159, at 468, 470-72.
168. See Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
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applicable to the particular case being tried.... [T]he
enforcement of the law against criminals and the protection
of citizens against unjust and groundless prosecutions,
would depend entirely upon juries uncontrolled by any
settled, fixed, legal principles.... When that occurs our
government will cease to be a government of laws, and
become a government of men.'
69
Today, it is widely accepted that courts, rather than juries, are to
determine questions of law, and juries are to determine questions of fact
and mixed questions of law and fact.
170
Although the American jury's power has waned over the last
century, the Supreme Court has recently breathed new life into the role
of the criminal jury. In its 2000 case of Apprendi v. New Jersey,17 1 the
Court upended decades of criminal sentencing practices by holding that
it is unconstitutional for a judge to base an offender's criminal sentence
on a factor determined by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence
instead of by a jury by proof beyond a reasonable doubt (when the
offender's trial was a jury trial).17 The Court stated that "[o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 73 It reasoned that the jury
exists to "guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers, and as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties.' 74
Thus anything less than a procedure ensuring that a sentence is based on
only jury-found facts would be "an unacceptable departure from the
jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice
system."'175 In United States v. Booker,176 the Court applied this
landmark decision to hold unconstitutional the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines as they had been applied for nearly twenty years. 177 This
resulted in transforming the once-mandatory Guidelines into a merely
169. Id. at 101-03.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995). Despite this modern
division of power, juries still retain the power, if not the right, to nullify. See supra note 149.
171. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
172. See id. at 491-92.
173. Id. at 490.
174. Id. at 477 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Id. at 497.
176. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
177. See id. at 245, 259 (plurality opinion) (determining that the Guidelines must be
viewed as advisory rather than mandatory); see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of
Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE




advisory system. 178 In finding the mandatory enhancements under the
Guidelines unconstitutional, the Court expressed concern that
The effect of the increasing emphasis on facts that
enhanced sentencing ranges... was to increase the judge's
power and diminish that of the jury. It became the judge,
not the jury, who determined the upper limits of
sentencing ... [which resulted in] the jury's finding of the
underlying crime [becoming] less significant.17 9
While these cases do not fully restore the American jury to its pre-Sparf
power, they have shed light on the importance of the jury to serve as a
bulwark between the government and the individual i s and, as one
scholar has asserted, "open[ed] the possibility of returning the jury to its
historical role of judging not only the facts of the case, but the meaning
of the law as applied to a particular defendant."'18'
V. VIEWING EIGHTH AMENDMENT CRUELTY AS A MIXED QUESTION OF
LAW AND FACT
The reasons for the general dilution of the jury's power in the
nineteenth century do not explain why the First Amendment question of
obscenity remained with the jury but the Eighth Amendment question of
cruelty was diverted to judges. The professionalization of law and the
complexity of legal questions are not any more enhanced in the Eighth
Amendment cruelty context such that it was necessary to shift this
constitutional moral question to expert judges. In fact, one might
conclude that if either question is more complex, it is the First
Amendment question of obscenity. While there is no clear legal formula
for determining Eighth Amendment cruelty in criminal law,' at least in
the obscenity context (despite Justice Stewart's diminishment of the
issue when he said that he just knows it when he sees it'83) the Miller
Court gave a rather specific prescription for identifying obscene
material in its three-pronged test of appealing to the prurient interest,
178. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
179. Id. at 236.
180. See id. at 237.
181. Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury's Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 38), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1486188. But cf Ring v. Arizona 536
U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the Ring case, in which the Court
held that statutorily enumerated aggravating factors subjecting a defendant to the death penalty
must be found by a jury, "has nothing to do with jury sentencing").
182. But see Ryan, supra note 26, at 124, 149 (suggesting that motive and method are
central to the cruelty inquiry).
183. See Jacobellis v. State, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Potter, J., concurring); supra text
accompanying note 86.
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depicting sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacking
serious value. 184 The First Amendment question is thus formulated in a
more systematized way, suggesting that if either question should be
given to the judge it should be the determination of obscenity rather
than cruelty. Just as professionalization seems to be a greater concern in
the obscenity context, the lack of competency on the part of jurors
would, for the same reason, be more worrisome when jurors are asked
to determine the complex issue of obscenity under Miller rather than the
simple question of cruelty, which is more intuitive. 185 Because it is a
less complex issue, there should be greater trust in jurors with the moral
question of cruelty.
Any trepidation that jurors undermine our representative
government should not be greater in the cruelty context than in the
obscenity area. In both instances, jurors have the potential to upset
legislative enactments, but in both cases, jurors also have the ability to
protect individuals from rash and unjust governmental actions.
Concerns of tyrannical democratic majorities might similarly be
equivalent between obscenity and cruelty questions. In both instances,
there is a possibility that juries will react strongly to the unsettling
subjects-either explicit or pornographic speech or materials that could
be considered obscene on the one hand, or violent or other horrific
crimes perpetrated by individuals on the other. One might argue that
there is greater concern with respect to impulsive actions taken by juries
imposing or reviewing punishments because, often, the public can
become easily outraged in response to violent crimes, such as in child
rape cases and other cases involving crimes against children.' 86 In some
parts of the country, though, the public may become equally inflamed
when faced with, for example, images of graphic nudity.
Further, history suggests that the Anti-Federalists' view of the Bill
of Rights lauded the jury and viewed it as a necessary bulwark between
the government and the people.' 87 The centrality of the jury is, of
course, consistent with the original division of labor between judges and
juries, where juries were entrusted to resolve questions of law as well as
184. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
185. See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of
Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 564 (2006) (recognizing the intuitive aspect of
determining what sentence an offender deserves and highlighting the instinctual nature of
discerning punishments that are too cruel to be imposed).
186, The recent trial of Casey Anthony, for example, conjured up significant public
outrage. See, e.g., Order Establishing Rules Goveming Members of the Public, Florida v.
Anthony, No. 48-2008-CF-015606-O (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. 2011), available at http://www.ninth
circuit.org/news/High-Profile-Cases/Anthony/Downloads/Order%20Establishi
ng%20Rules%20Goveming%20Members%20of/o20the%2OPublic.pdf (limiting access to the
courtroom to only those in possession of a "seating pass").
187. See supra text accompanying notes 135-137, 174, 180.
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questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact. Naturally, this
greater role on the part of juries suggests less uniformity on these
constitutional moral questions, which is related to the nineteenth-
century concern that the breakdown in society resulting from America's
continued growth-and the concomitant variation in values among
members of the public-would lead to inconsistent and unpredictable
jury verdicts. This constitutional nonuniformity, though, as in the First
Amendment context, was contemplated and embraced by at least some
of the Founding generation. In fact, as one scholar has explained, the
"Punishments Clause was understood as imposing common-law
constraints on the federal government's power to punish, and... the
common law was understood as varying State by State,... [thus] the
Anti-Federalists contemplated that the meaning of 'cruel and unusual'
punishments might vary according to the locale."' 88 Moreover, the
concern of notice to defendants that arises when there is a lack of
uniformity in the law is arguably less concerning in the Punishments
Clause context than under the Court's obscenity jurisprudence. This
results from the fact that, while individuals may rely on legal precedent
in ascertaining whether their planned courses of conduct would be
considered criminal, research suggests that would-be offenders rely
significantly less on what type of punishment they will receive, or
whether any imposed punishment will be considered unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual when determining whether to engage in a particular
type of conduct18 Eighth Amendment issues are certainly important, in
part because they often amount to cases of life or death-such as when
the Supreme Court determined that Christopher Simmons, despite
receiving a sentence of death for first-degree murder, could not be
executed because he was a juvenile when he committed the offense.' 90
But the criminal law literature is rife with accounts of why more is at
stake when determining issues of criminal liability than issues of
sentencing. After all, in the first instance, we could be dealing with
completely innocent individuals. Once an individual has been found
guilty, however, he may be deprived of some aspects of his dignity, and
he loses some of the constitutional protections to which an innocent
individual is entitled. 191 Therefore, because the First Amendment
188. Mannheimer, supra note 135, at 74.
189. See Yair Listokin, Crime and (With a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of
Discounting for Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 115, 122 (2007). Would-be
offenders, like other individuals, likely discount the future. This means that if a sentence is
imposed sometime in the future, it has less of a deterrent effect than if it was imposed
immediately. Id.
190. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
191. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (upholding the
constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement statutes). Note that I am not suggesting that a
convicted person can be deprived of the protections provided by the Eighth Amendment
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question of obscenity constitutes an issue of criminal liability, whereas
the Eighth Amendment question of cruelty relates to sentencing, one
might conclude that more is at stake in the obscenity context.
Accordingly, even if there is a concern about the unpredictability
inherent in jury decisions, if it is appropriate to entrust the question of
obscenity to a jury, then it would seem to be equally appropriate to trust
juries to decide questions of cruelty.
While the reasons for the jury's decline in power do not adequately
explain the disparate treatment between constitutional moral
decisionmaking in the First Amendment and Eighth Amendment areas,
approaching the Eighth Amendment issue as a mixed question of law
and fact, just like in the First Amendment context, would curb scholars'
existing criticisms of the Court's reliance on its own independent
judgment in cruelty determinations. Viewed as a mixed question of law
and fact for the jury to resolve, the question of cruelty would no longer
be decided by the whims of unrepresentative judges who are often not
held accountable to the people.' 92 Many judges confronting Eighth
Amendment issues have life tenure and thus may not be directly swayed
by public opinion in determining issues of cruelty. Indeed, this isolation
of judges is the justification for awarding them life tenure in the first
place. And, while judges are notoriously unrepresentative of either
the American public at large or their individual communities, 194 juries
are tailored to be representative of the latter, at least within limits.'
95
Punishments Clause.
192. But cf Friedman, supra note 115 (arguing that even judges are "relatively
majoritarian").
193. See Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence,
75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1406 (1991) (noting that federal judges are provided life tenure and
protected against salary reductions so that they are not susceptible to outside influence).
194. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the Court as a "small and unrepresentative segment of our society"); Harry S. Gerla,
The "Reasonableness" Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values Receive Their
Due?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 199, 223 (1990) ("Judges are a highly unrepresentative cross
section of society. Judges are more predominantly male, white, and wealthy than the body
politic as a whole. While juries are perhaps also unrepresentative of their communities, they
mirror the characteristics of those communities much closer than do judges.").
195. As Professor Stephen Smith has noted,
jury-selection practices may serve to undermine the degree to which the petit
jury is truly representative of the community. The removal of jurors for cause
or through peremptory challenges may cause juries to lose some degree of the
representativeness they had at the venire stage. Moreover, in capital cases, the
controversial but accepted practice of "death qualifying" juries has been shown
to result in "hanging juries" that have fewer minorities and women and are
significantly more likely to convict and impose the death penalty than other
juries. Still, local representativeness is a central idea behind the American
conception of criminal juries.
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Moreover, juries are just as competent, if not more competent, to make
a decision on this moral question of cruelty, which is a matter of
personal values. While the jury's resolution of the issue could equally
lack the standards that the Court's application of its independent
judgment seems to currently lack, thus rendering it susceptible to the
criticism of being suspect in terms of its sociological legitimacy,1 96 this
could be remedied through the use of appropriate jury instructions. A
jury could be directed, for example, to base its determination of
unconstitutional cruelty on matters such as whether the defendant
deserves such a harsh punishment, whether similarly situated offenders
have received similar punishments, and whether the punishment is
likely to deter this offender from committing further crimes or whether
it is likely to deter others. 197 Ultimately, Professor Allen's conclusion
that constitutional moral questions should be controlled by society
98
would be well served by shifting the cruelty question to juries.
Not only would charging juries with resolving cruelty address
concerns of anti-democratism and sociological legitimacy, but it would
allow cruelty determinations to be more precisely rooted in the facts at
hand.199 While Eighth Amendment questions are often decided
categorically today,200especially in the death penalty context,
accounting for the salient facts of Punishments Clause cases would be
useful in achieving sufficiently individualized punishments for
offenders. Individualization in sentencing has long been held important
by many sentencing scholars. Since the advent of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, they have asserted that the lost individualization
of sentencing under the Guidelines is worth protesting. Individualized
Stephen F. Smith, Localism and Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REv. EN BANc 105, 111
(2011).
196. See supra text accompanying note 54.
197. Cf Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing
Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2223, 2233-35 (explaining that
informing jurors of the consequences of conviction could inspire the jurors, in the name of
justice, to acquit defendants who might otherwise be found guilty). This is just a sampling of
some of the factors that may be relevant in the cruelty determination. Whether a defendant
deserves the punishment relates to the Court's focus on retribution in resolving Punishments
Clause questions, see supra text accompanying note 26; whether similarly situated offenders
have received similar punishments derives from the Court's noncapital Punishments Clause
jurisprudence, see supra text accompanying notes 27-28; and whether the punishment is likely
to deter again relates to the Court's focus on the purposes of punishment under its independent
judgment analysis, see supra text accompanying note 26.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
199. Cf generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
229 (discussing the role of constitutional fact review in appellate court decisionmaking).
200. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010) (describing the categorical
approach); supra text accompanying notes 41-43, 47.
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
sentencing, they have argued, is essential to achieving justice. 20 1
Without the context of an offender's individual circumstances, judges
and juries cannot impose sentences that are fair and appropriate.202 in
particular, because the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation are at the heart of sentencing, individualization is
essential to accurately concentrate punishment on these specific goals.
One scholar has explained that individualized factors, such as a
defendant's education, are essential to implementing the traditional
punishment goals through sentencing and should therefore be central to
sentencing inquiries. 203- For example, "[a] man or woman with no
employment prospects or an unstable emotional condition is more likely
to return to crime, and thus could be a stronger candidate for
incapacitation., 20 4 Considering that the purposes of sentencing are
central not only to imposing a sentence in the first instance, but also to
determining whether a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel under the
Eighth Amendment, 20 5 accounting for these purposes in determining
cruelty should similarly involve more detailed and fact-based accounts
of how these specific goals could be served by the sentence actually
imposed. This approach would advance the Court's directive that, in
capital sentencing, juries must be allowed to consider, in all but the
rarest cases, mitigating evidence proffered by the capital defendant that
bears on the defendant's character, his record, or the circumstances of
the crime.20
6
Finally, giving greater power to juries in the resolution of
constitutional moral questions such as cruelty is consistent with the
Court's recent trend of returning to juries some of the power they lost in
the nineteenth century. This shift would further address the Apprendi
and Booker Courts' concern of maintaining the jury's role as a guard
against government's oppression and as the "great bulwark of [our] civil
and political liberties." ' This could be one step further in returning the
jury to its historical prominence. 20 8
201. See Terence F. MacCarthy et al., Individualized Sentences and Alternatives to
Imprisonment, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 211, 211 (1993).
202. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1938, 1953 (1988) (favoring a "system
that... consider[s] the offender's personal characteristics").
203. See Mark Osler, Uniformity and Traditional Sentencing Goals in the Age of Feeney,
16 FED. SENT'G REP. 253, 254 (2004).
204. Id.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 55-60.
206. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
207. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
208. See Carroll, supra note 181, at 38; supra text accompanying notes 142-149, 171-182.
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VI. OBVIOUS PROCEDURAL HURDLES
Considering that the reasons related to the jury's decline in the
nineteenth century are unable to explain the different treatment of the
questions of cruelty and obscenity, as well as the promise of
individualization that jury determinations would bring to the
Punishments Clause area, perhaps procedural differences in obscenity
and Punishments Clause cases account for the disparate approaches.
Whereas questions of obscenity ordinarily constitute principal issues in
a trial, questions of the constitutionality of a punishment under the
Eighth Amendment often arise in a slightly different context.
Frequently, a defendant who has just been sentenced may directly
appeal his sentence and at that time assert that it violates the Eighth
Amendment. In some jurisdictions an appeal of a death sentence is even
automatic, such as was the case in Atkins.209 In contrast, the criminal
defendant in Baze v. Rees210 pursued his Eighth Amendment claim by
requesting a declaration of rights pursuant to state law. 21 Further, in
several jurisdictions a defendant may challenge the constitutionality of
his sentence by applying for postconviction relief. In Missouri, for
example, "[a] person convicted of a felony... [who claims] that the
conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of
[Missouri] or the constitution of the United States. . . may seek relief in
the sentencing court .... ,212 This was the avenue that Christopher
209. See VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:22(b); Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 453 (Va.
1999); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35 (2008) (delineating the automatic review procedure);
Coker v. State, 216 S.E.2d 782, 795-96 (Ga. 1975) (explaining the procedure by which the
defendant's death penalty is automatically reviewed by the state supreme court).
210. 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006).
211. See id. at 209. A plaintiff requesting such a declaration of rights must follow
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 57, which provides that "the right to trial by jury may be
demanded under the circumstances." Ky. R. Civ. P. 57. But this does not mean that the jury will
determine the issue of whether the punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 418.040 (West 2006) (providing that a "plaintiff may ask for a declaration of
rights, either alone or with other relief' when an actual controversy exists and that "the court
may make a binding declaration of rights, whether or not consequential relief is or could be
asked").
212. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 29.15; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 547.360 (West 2002) (codifying
almost verbatim the language of Rule 29.15). Stich postconviction review benefits the
individualization potential of Eighth Amendment determinations because, as one scholar has
explained, it has an "intra-system quality"-"the postconviction judge and the prosecutor
defending the postconviction action will be familiar with the state law applicable to the case,
and quite likely the facts as well, as state postconviction proceedings are often brought before
the same trial court that imposed judgment." Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague
Retroactivity, or "Redressability, " After Danforth v. Minnesota. Why Lower Courts Should
Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction
Proceedings, 46 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1, 57 (2009).
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Simmons followed to obtain relief in Roper.213 Moreover, a defendant
may raise his Eighth Amendment claim in a state or federal habeas
corpus petition, as was the case in Ford v. Wainwright,214 wherein the
Court ultimately concluded that the death penalty was unwarranted due
to the offender's mental incapacity. 2 1 The avenues for raising Eighth
Amendment claims are clearly varied and depend upon the
jurisdiction's particular rules and procedures, but they tend to be first
raised on appeal or in a separate habeas corpus procedure and are not
ordinarily decided at the sentencing stage itself. In fact, in several cases
in which defense counsel have tried to raise the issue at sentencing,
courts have found this inappropriate.
216
Due to the different procedures at trial, where obscenity issues are
first raised, and on appeal, where Punishments Clause issues are often
first raised, a jury is available to decide obscenity issues whereas a jury
will often no longer be empaneled by the time that a defendant raises an
Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence. It might be easier to
empanel a jury in a habeas case than on appeal, but the use of juries is
not common in habeas.2 17 Under the federal habeas statute, for example,
it is the court's role to "summarily hear and determine the facts, and
dispose of the matter as law and justice require., 218 While the statute
"does not preclude the use of an advisory jury pursuant to Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 39 (c),",219 Moore's Federal Practice asserts that "advisory
juries.., should be restricted. .. to the exceptional case where there
are peculiar and unique circumstances supporting its use," in part
because it would likely delay the proceedings. Interestingly, when an
213. See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (discussing the
procedural posture in the Roper case).
214. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 404 (1986), rev'g Ford v. Wainwright, 752
F.2d 526, 527 (1 th Cir. 1985).
215. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
216. See, e.g., Nevarez v. State, 832 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that
the lower court did not err in refusing "to charge the jury concerning cruel and unusual
punishment" because the defendant's punishment was not unconstitutional); Brooks v. State,
642 S.W.2d 791, 799 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1982) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to determine whether the punishment of life
imprisonment was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).
217. See Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framer's Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury
Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OH1O ST. L.J. 887, 888 (2010) (stating that "[m]odem
habeas review of convictions and sentences involves judges, and judges only, conducting
'judicial inquisitions' and then resolving factual and legal disputes without any jury input," but
arguing that "there is no obvious constitutional or statutory impediment to federal judges right
now opting to empanel juries to aid" in habeas determinations).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006); see also Berman, supra note 217, at 888 ("Modem habeas
review of convictions and sentences involves judges, and judges only ... ").
219. Sigler v. Parker, 396 U.S. 482, 487 n.* (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
220. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 39-42 n.19 (2d ed. 1996);
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Eighth Amendment complaint is raised as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the
question of cruel and unusual punishment is often left to juries to
determine. 22 1 The same is true with respect to criminal claims under 18
U.S.C. § 242, which is the criminal equivalent to § 1983.222 This leaves
a surprising framework in which many issues of cruel and unusual
punishment are decided by judges, but some are actually decided by
juries. And there seems to be no problem of unworkability, or even
nonuniformity, when this issue is decided by juries as a mixed question
of law and fact rather than by judges as pure questions of law.
Overall, this procedural difficulty of the unavailability of a jury in
some contexts in which the issue of cruel and unusual punishments is
raised should not trump the constitutional salience of the jury to this
important question. The fact that the jury's role was central to
determinations of cruel and unusual punishment during the Founding
Era, the importance of the jury in determining such moral questions, and
see also Sigler, 396 U.S. at 487. Professor Douglas Berman argues, however, that this efficiency
argument is no longer valid because "modem federal habeas actions are now anything but
efficiently resolved by judges." Berman, supra note 217, at 911. Instead, he argues, that juries
should be involved in habeas determinations. See generally id.
221. See Pattern Jury Instructions for Cases of Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments: For the District Courts of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit § 2.1, (June 4, 2002), available at http://www.med.uscourts.gov/
practices/excessiveforce09jul3.pdf (instructing juries on their determinations of cruel and
unusual punishment in the context of excessive force by a corrections officer).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Kulp, No. 97-CR-14, 1997 WL 438834, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa.
July 30, 1997) (discussing jury instructions related to the Eighth Amendment in a § 242 case).
Section 242 provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being
an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for
the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if
such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a
dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if
such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated
sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or
an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for
any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to
death.
18 U.S.C. § 242.
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the jury's capability to closely examine the facts of a case to determine
whether the imposed punishment exceeds the bounds of retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, are all more important
than strictly maintaining the current procedural framework for deciding
criminal questions of cruel and unusual punishment. To harness the
advantages of allowing juries to decide these constitutional moral
questions, courts could empanel special juries to decide them. It would
perhaps be more prudent, however, to have issues of cruel and unusual
punishment decided in the first instance as part of the penalty or
sentencing phase of trial rather than on appeal when juries are ordinarily
not readily available. In most capital cases, in which many of these
questions of cruel and unusual punishments are raised, courts are
required to ask juries whether capital punishment is appropriate.223
When juries are thus involved in sentencing criminal offenders, courts
could simply allow the defendant's counsel to make Punishments
Clause arguments to the jury where appropriate. This is contrary to at
least some courts' practice of denying counsel the ability to make such
arguments at this stage. 224 Courts could then instruct jurors on the limits
of punishment under the Eighth Amendment. These instructions could
broadly direct jurors to ensure, in formulating an appropriate sentence
for the offender, that the punishment is not unduly cruel. Alternatively,
these instructions could be more narrow to align with the Supreme
Court case law on Punishments Clause determinations, as is done when
instructing jurors on cruel and unusual punishments pursuant to
§ 1983. This could be difficult in criminal Punishments Clause
determinations, however, because the Court has not clearly articulated
relevant factors to consider in determining whether a punishment is
unconstitutionally cruel under the Eighth Amendment.226 As I have
argued elsewhere, though, Eighth Amendment cruelty determinations
should be based on factors related to the punisher's motive and the
223. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES,
AND GUIDELINES 254 (2d ed. 2007) ("Although very few states rely on juries for noncapital
sentencing decisions, nearly all states that authorize the death penalty give juries a central role in
capital sentencing."); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Fear and Trembling in Criminal Judgment, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRim. L. 827, 846 (2010) ("[I]t's worth noting that all constitutionally approved systems of
capital punishment in the United States provide for jury participation in sentencing, and in most
but not all instances, death requires jury approval.").
224. See, e.g., Nevarez v. State, 832 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that
the lower court did not err in refusing "to charge the jury concerning cruel and unusual
punishment" because the defendant's punishment was not unconstitutional); Brooks v. State,
642 S.W.2d 791, 799 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1982) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to determine whether the punishment of life
imprisonment was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual).
225. See supra note 103.
226. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 83.
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nature and quality of the punishment at issue.227
In noncapital cases, 228 it could be more difficult to implement this
greater role for the jury in Punishments Clause determinations. A
handful of states employ jury sentencing, which would make it just as
easy to instruct sentencers on the limitations of punishment as in the
capital context. There are good reasons for jurisdictions to engage in
jury sentencing229 -some of which overlap with the reasons for
allowing juries to resolve issues of unconstitutional cruelty-but the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions leave sentencing to judges'
discretion. In this context, it might be worth empaneling a jury to
ascertain the people's view of the current standards of decency. After
all, jury members are more representative of the vicinage in which the
crime occurred and are much more likely to be representative of the
nation as a whole than are the predominantly well-educated, upper class
Caucasion male judges in both the federal and state systems.230
Empaneling a jury in this context could take its toll on the jurisdiction's
resources and also delay already stagnant proceedings, however. At a
minimum, sentencing courts should specifically address questions of
unconstitutional cruelty, treating them as mixed questions of law and
fact rather than as pure questions of law. By doing so, trial court judges
will be empowered to engage closely with the facts in determining the
constitutionality punishments and also equip appellate court judges to
rule more clearly on these issues rather than making overly broad
determinations about the constitutionality punishments.
CONCLUSION
Juries stand at the heart of our criminal justice system because they
act as a bulwark of liberty by protecting individuals from overreaching
legislatures and unrepresentative judges. It only makes sense, then, for
juries to protect criminal offenders from punishments that society deems
unduly cruel. While this is contrary to the commonly accepted
understanding that most constitutional questions are purely legal
questions to be decided by judges, the Court's First Amendment
obscenity jurisprudence demonstrates that juries are just as capable of
resolving some constitutional questions. This is especially so when
those questions are rooted in society's moral values, as in the
227. See id at 124, 149. Courts could also inform jurors of, or allow evidence on, how
similarly situated offenders have been sentenced, thus allowing jurors to compare sentences in
similar cases as judges are able to do.
228. In contrast to capital cases, noncapital cases often do not include juries in sentencing
decisions.
229. See generally Iontcheva, supra note 1, at 314 (arguing that jury sentencing is central
to implementing democratic rule).
230. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
FLORIDA LA WREVIEW
Punishments Clause context, and when individual facts are important to
resolving the questions, as is the case when the details of a crime and a
criminal offender's history and personal characteristics are relevant to
the determination of the appropriate sentence to impose. Based on the
prominence of the jury in the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights
and the fact that criminal law is primarily a matter of local concern, one
could argue that juries should be resolving many, if not all,
constitutional questions that arise in the criminal context. For example,
a jury may be better equipped to determine whether a Fourth
Amendment search is "reasonable" or whether police officers used
unconstitutionally coercive force, that runs afoul of the Fifth
Amendment, to extract a confession. Again, these standards are rooted
in society's value judgments. But Eighth Amendment determinations of
cruel and unusual punishment are even more firmly grounded in
society's mores, and the history of the Punishments Clause emphasizes
the jury's importance to these decisions. In the tradition of Apprendi
and Booker, it is important to rethink whether our recent practice of
leaving these findings to judges rather than juries is constitutionally
appropriate.
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